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Via Hand Delivery

Julia D'AIesandro
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

Manuel Guevara v. Morris Air, Inc., et al.
Case No. 960832CA

Dear Ms. D'AIesandro:
This letter is a citation of supplemental authority pursuant to Rule 24(i),
URAP.
I represent defendant/respondent Morris Air, Inc. Manuel Guevara,
plaintiff/appellant, appeals from summary judgment dismissing his action.
The appeal has been fully briefed and oral argument will be held on
September 22, 1997.
Manuel Guevara's reply brief on appeal argues that Morris Air did not
offer sufficient facts in the trial court to clarify the relationship among the parties
(Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 13-14).
In Jensen v. IHC Hospitals. 324 UAR 20, filed August 22, 1997, the
Utah Supreme Court observed that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Once the
moving party has properly supported its motion, the non-moving party bear& the burden
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of providing some evidence in support of the es?enti?1 elements of his claim in order to
successfully oppose the motion (324 UAR at 22).
Yours very truly,
STRONG & HANNI

Roger H. Bullock
RHB/db
cc:

Robert J. DeBry (via facsimile and U. S. Mail)
Attorney for Manuel Guevara
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell,
individually and on behalf of all other heirs
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele
Hipwdl and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell
appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guardian
1 ad litem,
I Plaintiffs,
Appellants,
and
Cross-Appellees,
v.
fflC HOSPITALS, Inc., dba McKay-Dee
J Hospital, and Michael J. Healy, M.D M
and Does I through X,
Defendants,
Appellees,
and
Cross-Appellant.
No. 950164
FILED: August 22, 1997
Third District, Salt Lake Div. I
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki
ATTORNEYS:
Richard D. Burbidge, Stephen B. Mitchell,
Gary R. Johnson, Salt Lake City, and
Simon H. Forgette, Kirkland, Wash., for
plaintiffs
James W. Gilson, Kathy A. Lavitt, Salt Lake
City, for IHC
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg,
Salt Lake City, for Dr. Healy
On Petition for Rehearing
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
This court now grants rehearing and issues
this opinion without hearing oral argument. We
address whether we should uphold nummary
judgment^in^favor of defendant McKay-Dee
Hospital ("McKay-Dee") because plaintiffs
Shayne Hipwell and Sherry Jensen's wrongful
death action against McKay-Dee was barred by
the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
See Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4. In our prior
opinion in this case, we reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment as to all defendants
and remanded on the issue of whether defendant
Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy") alleged fraud
in collaborating with plaintiffs' original attorney
was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations on
their medical malpractice claims once they had
retained an independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 29 (Apr.
4, 1997). We further held that Jensen and

Code*Co
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malpractice wrongful death claim as a claim for
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitations. Id. at
30. In its petition for rehearing, McKay-Dee
now claims that summary judgment in its favor
should have been upheld because (i) Dr. Healy's
fraud does not toll the statute of limitations as to
Jensen
and
Hipwell's
claims
against
McKay-Dee; and (ii) Jensen and Hipwell's
allegations of fraud on the part of McKay-Dee
were properly dismissed by the trial court.
We begin with a brief review of the facts
relevant to our decision on rehearing. Because
we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we view the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving parties, Jensen and Hipwell. Id.
at 25. Jensen and Hipwell allege that Dr. Healy,
who had staff privileges at McKay-Dee but was
not employed by McKay-Dee, committed
malpractice on Shelly Hipwell (Jensen's
daughter and Hipwell's wife) while she was a
patient at McKay-Dee. They claim that, to cover
his alleged malpractice, he and a McKay-Dee
doctor fraudulently transferred Shelly to
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell further
allege that Dr. Healy then colluded with his
brother, attorney Tim Healy, and attorney Roger
Sharp to prevent Jensen and Hipwell from
learning of the malpractice Dr. Healy had
allegedly committed. Jensen and Hipwell made
no allegation that McKay-Dee knew about Dr.
Healy's collusion with his brother and attorney
Sharp.
In our prior opinion, we held that Jensen and
HipwelFs allegations of fraud against Dr. Healy
were sufficient to toll the statute of limitations
on their claims as long as they retained attorney
Sharp. Id. at 28. However, we remanded to the
trial court on the issue of whether Dr. Healy's
alleged fraud was sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations after Jensen and Hipwell retained
independent counsel but before that counsel had
actual knowledge of the facts constituting Dr.
Healy's alleged fraud. Id. at 28-29. The issues
we now address are (i) whether Dr. Healy's
alleged fraud can also act to toll the statute of
limitations as to McKay-Dee; and (ii) whether
Jensen and HipwelFs allegations of fraud on the
part of McKay-Dee are sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee. These
issues were not discussed in our initial opinion.
As to the first issue, whether Dr. Healy's
fraudulent collusion with Jensen and Hipwell's
original attorney can toll the statute of
limitations as to McKay-Dee, the general rule is
that fraud committed by a third party in
concealing a cause of action against another
defendant will not toll the statute of limitations
as to that defendant. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d
Limitation of Actions §150 (1970). Where,
however, there is an agency or privity
relationship between the third party committing I
the fraud and the defendant, our cases indicate
that liability for the agent's negligent or

21

the purposes of the principal. See Hodges v.
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah
1991): Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 P.2d
1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). 1 On the record before
us, we cannot determine whether Dr. Healy's
fraud in colluding with attorney Sharp and
attorney Healy should be imputed to McKay-Dee
absent two factual findings: (i) that Dr. Healy
was McKay-Dee's agent; and (ii) that Dr. Healy
acted in whole or in part to further the aims of
McKay-Dee.
The
complaint
makes
no
allegations regarding these issues. We remand to
the trial court for further proceedings.
If the trial court finds that Dr. Healy v/as
McKay-Dee's agent and that he acted at least in
part to further McKay-Dee's aims, it should
impute liability for Dr. Healy's fraud to
McKay-Dee and toll the statute of limitations as
to McKay-Dee to the same extent it is tolled as
to Dr. Healy. 2 If, on the other hand, the trial
court finds either that Dr. Healy was not
McKay-Dee's agent or that Dr. Healy acted
"entirely on personal motives unrelated to
[McKay-Dee's] interests," Hodges, 811 P.2d at
157, then Dr. Healy's fraud does not toll the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee and
Jensen and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee
are barred.
Moving to the second issue raised on
rehearing, Jensen and Hipwell argue that the
statute of limitations as to McKay-Dee should be
tolled because of fraud allegedly committed by
McKay-Dee, through one of its doctors, in
participating in an allegedly fraudulent transfer
of Shelly Hipwell from McKay-Dee to
University Hospital. Jensen and Hipwell did not
originally argue that McKay-Dee had committed
fraud that would toll the statute of limitations.
Their complaint did, however, include a count
of constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. The
trial court held first that the medical malpractice
statute of limitations, section 78-14-4 of the
Code, barred Jensen and Hipwell's claim of
constructive fraud against McKay-Dee. In the
alternative, the trial court ruled that the claim
was "unsupported by the facts" and that there
was "insufficient evidence to submit this matter
to a jury as the fact finder." In our original
opinion, we upheld the trial court's finding that
Jensen and Hipwell's claim for constructive
fraud amounted to nothing more than a claim for
medical malpractice, which would be barred by
the medical malpractice statute of limitations.
Jensen, 314 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. We did not
address, however, the contention that Jensen and
Hipwell's allegations of constructive fraud on
the part of McKay-Dee would be sufficient to
toll the statute of limitations on Jensen and
Hipwell's medical malpractice claims against
McKay-Dee. We find that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment to
McKay-Dee, ruling that Jensen and Hipwell's
constructive fraud claim was insufficiently
supported by the evidence and therefore could

324 Utah Adv. Re~pT 2fr"

careful analysis of the relative burdens of proof
and production involved in making and opposing
a motion for summary judgment. As noted
above, when reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, we view all facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 25. On
a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party bears the burden of proof for its motion,
namely, the burden of proving that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. However, in opposing a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the
ultimate burden of proving all the elements of
his or her cause of action. Thayne v. Beneficial
Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994).
Further, once challenged, the party who opposes
such a motion must come forward with sufficient
proof to support his or her claim, particularly
when that party has had an opportunity to
conduct discovery. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.411
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary
judgment u may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his [or her) pleading,
but his [or her] response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis
add&d). Put another way, once the moving party
has "brought forth evidence either tending to
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or
challenging the existence of one of the elements
of the cause of action, the nonmoving party then
bears the burden of a provid[ing] some evidence,
by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the
essential elements of his [or herj claim."
Thayne, 874 P.2d at 124.
In this case, Jensen and Hipwell failed to
provide any such evidence to support their claim
of constructive fraud. Constructive fraud
requires two elements: (i) a confidential
relationship between the parties; and (ii) a
failure to disclose material facts. See Blodgett v.
Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Utah 1978); 37
Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§4, 15 (1968).
Jensen and HipwelTs complaint alleges both (i)
that McKay-Dee's employee. Dr. Baughman,
had a confidential relationship with Shelly and
her family as one of her treating physicians, and
(ii) that Dr. Baughman failed to disclose that he
had committed medical malpractice in treating
Shelly. McKay-Dee's motion for summary
judgment did not challenge Jensen and Hipwell's
assertion that Dr. Baughman had a confidential
relationship with Shelly and her family.
McKay-Dee's motion, however, did dispute
Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that Dr.
Baughman failed to disclose his alleged
malpractice.
McKay-Dee
produced
the
deposition of Dr. Baughman, wherein he states,
U
I have no question at all that [Shelly] received
care that's exemplary, that could be used as an
example of the management of a good
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Shelly's care. McKay-Dee properly challenged
Jensen and Hipwell's allegation that Dr.
Baughman had failed to discharge his duty to
disclose material facts to them, namely, the fact
that he had committed malpractice, by producmg
Dr. Baughman's deposition in which he states
that he did not believe and does not believe that
he committed malpractice.
Jensen and Hipwell, however, as the
nonmoving parties, utterly failed to meet their
burden of coming forward with evidence to
contradict Dr. Baughman's deposition testimony.
In their opposition to McKay-Dee's motion for
summary judgment, Jensen and Hipwell simply
reiterate the allegations of their complaint and
provide no support for their claim that Dr.
Baughman failed to tell them that Shelly had
been "left to bleed internally for several hours
before accurately diagnosing her illness." Dr.
Baughman's deposition testimony specifically
and directly challenges Jensen and Hipwell's
assertion, and they failed to provide any
evidence to support their claim. Thus, the trial
court correctly ruled that there was insufficient'
evidence to submit the matter to a jury. Because
Jensen and Hipwell's claim of constructive fraud
against McKay-Dee was insufficiently supported
by the evidence, such a claim cannot be used to
toll the statute of limitations on their medical
malpractice claims against McKay-Dee.
We remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Howe, Justice Russon, Judge Eves,
and Judge Halliday concur in Chief Justice
Zimmerman's opinion.
Having disqualified themselves, Associate
Chief Justice Stewart and Justice Durham do not
participate herein; District Judge J. Philip Eves
and District Judge Bruce K. Halliday sat.

1. The cases cited also include two other factors to
consider in determining whether an agent's conduct
will be imputed to the principal in the employment
context: (i) whether the employee's conduct is of the
general kind the employee is expected to perform; and
(ii) whether the employee's conduct occurred within
the hours of the employee's work and ordinary spatial
boundaries. Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156; Birhier, 771
P.2d at 1056-57. As Dr. Healy was not McKay-Dee's
employee, these criteria would not seem to apply to
the question of whether Dr. Healy's acts fall within
the scope of any agency relationship he may have had
with McKay-Dee.
2. We note, however, that this issue will be moot if
the fact finder determines, pursuant to our prior
opinion, that Jensen and Hipwell's complaint was not
timely filed becaluse Dr. Healy's fraud did not toll the
statute of limitations long enough. See Jensen, 314
Utah Adv. Ref>. at 29. /
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2 (3) (k) , 78-2a-3 (2) (j) .
order granting
(R.123-24).

The

summary judgment was entered on July 10, 1996

Appellant's timely notice of appeal was filed on

August 9, 1996

(R.125-27),

The Utah

Supreme Court transferred

this case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about December 27,
1996.
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal if from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant.
for

All issues presented are reviewed as questions of law

correctness,

conclusions.

with

deference

to

the

trial

court's

See Schurtz v. BMW of North America, 814 P.2d 1108,

1111-12 (Utah 1991).
1.

no

Whether

The issues presented for review are:

the

court

below

erred

in

granting

summary

judgment to defendant on the ground that, as a travel agent, it was
immune from liability for the negligence of a services provider,
when the determination of that status required resolving a factual
dispute

and

where

the

law

does

not

recognize

such

immunity?

(preserved for review at R.60-62).
2.

Whether,

the

court

below

erred

in

granting

summary

judgment to defendant on the ground that, under its contract with
1

plaintiff, it was not liable for the negligence of a third party
where:
a.

the

contract

in

question

was

internally

contradictory and, thus, ambiguous as a matter of
law;
b.

admissible extrinsic evidence created a factual
dispute as to the intent of the parties and whether
apparent or ostensible authority existed and/or,

c.

the court simply applied one part of one provision,
without

regard

interpretation,

to

the

basic

including

the

law
need

of
to

contract
resolve

threshold issues such as completeness, integration
and ambiguity? (preserved at R.55-62, 77-108).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
This appeal include no determinative constitutional provision,
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the
Court Below.
Plaintiff Manuel Guevara appeals from the trial court's grant

of

summary judgment dismissing his negligence

contract claims against defendant

and breach of

Morris Air, Inc.

His claims

relate to personal injuries sustained in

Puerto Vallarta, Mexico,

during a vacation which he purchased as a package from Morris Air
(R.66-69, 74). Mr. Guevara was injured while disembarking from a
bus, during a tour which was part of the package (R.71-76).

The

direct operator of the bus was Tur Mexico (R.48), which Mr. Guevara
alleges was the agent and representative of Morris Air

(R.l-6).

After both sides conducted discovery, Morris Air moved for summary
judgment on the ground that it could not be held liable for the
negligence of Tur Mexico (R.45-54) .1
Specifically, Morris Air asserted two grounds for summary
judgment.

First, Morris Air maintained that it was merely a

"travel agent" and that, as such, it could not be liable for the
"independent negligence of parties performing travel services"
(R.49-52).

Second, Morris Air asserted that the charter ticket (or

passenger agreement) specifies that "other travel suppliers [such
as Tur Mexico] are not agents or employees of Morris Air, but are
independent contractors . . . " and, that it disclaims liability as
to Morris Air for any act or omission of such suppliers (R. 52-53) .
Morris Air's motion was supported by an excerpt from i[ 13 of the
charter ticket which

contains the supposed disclaimer (R.48), and

^•Whether or not Tur Mexico was, in fact, negligent is not at
issue on appeal. The grounds presented for summary judgment relate
solely to whether or not Morris Air would be liable, if Tur Mexico
had acted negligently.
3

by its assertion that it could not "locate" any written agreement
between itself and Tur Mexico (R.49).
In opposing summary judgment, Mr. Guevara provided a copy of
the entire charter ticket including the full text of ^ 13 (R.1008) . Notwithstanding the portion selectively offered by Morris Air,
that paragraph also specifically provides, that:
FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY, MORRIS AIR
SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and is
responsible
for making arrangements with
airlines,
hotels,
ground
transportation
companies, and other travel suppliers to
provide
the
services
and
accommodations
included in the trip.
(R.108)(emphasis added).
Mr. Guevara also produced additional written materials, which
had been provided to him by Morris Air in connection with his tour
package

(R.77-86).

These materials evidence a close association

between Morris Air and Tur Mexico, including a specific statement
that Morris Air's "Representative in Puerto Vallarta" was "Tur
Mexico" (R.79).

Mr. Guevara submitted an affidavit stating that

Morris Air employees held Tur Mexico out as its agent, and that he
relied upon those representations in purchasing the package (R.5960) .
Morris Air filed a Reply Memorandum
maintained

that

Mr.

Guevara's

understanding

representations was "not relevant" (R.116).
the representations were made.

(R.115-21), wherein it
of

these

It did not deny that

Notwithstanding its assertion that
4

Mr. Guevara's understanding of U 13 was a mere conclusion, Morris
Air also offered it's own interpretation of that disputed provision
(R.

116-17).

Unlike

Mr.

Guevara's

interpretation,

this

was

presented as mere argument, unsupported by affidavit or evidence.
Indeed, the only "evidence" presented by Morris Air, extrinsic to
the charter ticket, consists of its unsupported characterization
that it was merely a "travel agent," and the fact that it could
find no written agreement between itself and Tur Mexico.2
By Order dated July 10, 1996, the court below granted Morris
Air's Motion and entered summary judgment in its favor (R. 123-24).
That

Order

is a bare holding, which contains no

conclusion as to the basis for the court's decision.

findings or
The Order

does not state whether the court relied upon Morris Air's status as
a "travel agent" or upon its interpretation of the charter ticket.
The Order does not specify whether or not the court found that
ticket to be a complete, integrated and unambiguous agreement.

It

does not indicate what, if any, of the evidence offered by Mr.
Guevara the court actually considered.
B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for
Review.
Mr. Guevara purchased a vacation package from Morris Air,

which

included

a

charter

flight

2

to

Puerto

Vallarta,

hotel

Morris Air's motion for summary judgment cites to its own
self-serving interrogatory answers as support for the proposition
that it "acted as a travel agent" (R.48) . That is not a historical
fact, but an ultimate factual conclusion.
5

accommodations and other services, including ground transportation
and bus tours (R. 66-69) . Morris Air was the direct provider of the
charter flight.

Mr. Guevara's itinerary lists "Velas Vallarta" as

his hotel and "Tur Mexico" as the provider of "other services"
(R.81).

This was a tour package, assembled and sold by Morris Air

(R. 66-69).

It was not a tour, which was operated by others and

merely brokered by Morris Air.
The information brochure provided by Morris Air expressly
holds Tur Mexico out as its "Representative in Puerto Vallarta"
(R.79) ("[w]e are being represented by Tur Mexico").

Mr. Guevara

was advised by that document to contact Tur Mexico if he need
assistance (R.79).

Thus, although part of Tur Mexico's duties were

to provide ground transportation, it was not simply a bus service.
It provided a wide array of tour services on behalf of Morris Air
(R.81,

84).

Other materials provided

in connection with

package, refer jointly to Morris Air and Tur Mexico.

the

Buyers are

cautioned that "Morris Air Service & Tur Mexico have no connection"
with certain time share promotions (R.83).

There is a document on

Tur Mexico letterhead providing information from Morris Air (R.85) .
Mr.

Guevara

testified

that

Morris

Air

employees

made

oral

statements, that Tur Mexico was Morris Air's representative in
Mexico (R.Ill).
A

focal

point

of

ticket/customer agreement

the

dispute

(R.108).
6

is

H

13

of

the

charter

That provision first states,

that

Morris

Air

"acts

as

arranging certain services.

principal"

and

is

responsible

for

It then states, that Morris Air "acts

only as agent" of the suppliers of such services.

Next, it denies

that such suppliers are agents or representatives of Morris Air,
and states that they are

"independent

contractors."

Finally,

customers are cautioned, that they are "solely" responsible for
"[a]ny deviation from the advertised trip."

The full text of that

paragraph is as follows:
RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY,
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal
and is responsible for making arrangements
with airlines, hotels, ground transportation
companies, and other travel suppliers to
provide
the
services
and
accommodations
included in the trip; provided that where
MORRIS AIR SERVICE is the airline, it is
responsible
for
providing
directly
to
passengers the subject air transportation. In
all other cases, MORRIS AIR SERVICE acts only
as agent of the respective airline(s) and
other suppliers, and, as such, shall not be
responsible for the provision or operation of
such
flights
or
other
services
and
accommodations. In each case, transportation
provided by the airline is subject to all of
the terms and conditions of the respective
carrier's applicable tariff and/or contract of
carriage; refer to the air transportation
ticket for conditions of contract and notice
of incorporated terms, and inquire of the
airline for additional details. Also, other
airlines,
hotels,
ground
transportation
companies, and other travel suppliers are not
agents or employees of MORRIS AIR SERVICE, but
are independent contractors over whom MORRIS
AIR SERVICE has no control. Accordingly, you
hereby agree
that, except
as otherwise
provided herein, MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not
responsible or liable for any loss, injury,
expense, damage to property, or personal
7

sickness, injury or death which results
directly or indirectly from (a) any act or
failure to act (including, but not limited to,
delays), whether negligent or otherwise, of
any
other
airline,
hotel,
ground
transportation
company,
or other
travel
supplier, or (b) any other cause or act of
whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS AIR SERVICE'S
direct and immediate control.
Except as
otherwise specified herein, in the event of
non-operation of any Public Charter flight due
to reasons beyond our control, our sole
liability shall be to refund to you that
portion of the price allocable to the services
not provided.
Any deviation from the
advertised trip which you initiate is solely
your responsibility. Other matters concerning
your responsibilities and ours are as follows:
(R.108)(emphasis added).
Mr. Guevara was injured, during the course of a tour which was
part of the "advertised trip" (R. 71-76) . When he was disembarking
from a bus, directly operated by Tur Mexico, he was instructed by
the driver to walk between two parked buses (R. 72-73) . One of the
buses moved forward, pinning Mr. Guevara between them and crushing
his pelvis (R.74-76).
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

court

below

committed

reversible

error

by

factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991).

resolving
Winegar v.

It either made a

determination as to the nature of defendant's relationship with Tur
Mexico or, proceeded
contract.

to interpret an incomplete and

ambiguous

Even if the parties generally agree as to historical
8

facts, there exists a legitimate dispute as to the ultimate fact,
which precludes summary judgment.

Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d

1291, 1292 (Utah 1978).
(A)
It Was Not Disputed That Morris Air Was A Mere
Travel Agent
Whether or not there was an agency relationship--a central
issue here--is fact intensive and not generally an appropriate
subject for summary judgment.

Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co. of

N.Y. , 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988); Zions First National Bank
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095-96 (Utah 1988).

Here,

plaintiff presented evidence of written and oral representations by
defendant, supporting the existence of such an agency relationship.
It was, thus, error to grant summary judgment.

Zions Bank, 762

P.2d at 1095-96.
(B)
The Contract Is Not Unambiguous Nor Does The
Extrinsic Evidence Undisputedly Establish That
Morris Air Is Not Liable
The court below also erred to the extent that its grant of
summary judgment rests upon interpreting the parties agreement, and
holding defendant immune from liability under i[ 13 of the charter
ticket.
(1)
Paragraph

13

is

internally

ambiguous as a matter of law.

contradictory

and,

therefore,

Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co.,
9

846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1993).
Morris Air as the "principal."

It specifically refers to

The court could not resolve that

ambiguity on summary judgment. Id.
(2)
Because the charter ticket is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is
admissible

and must be considered

in resolving

the ambiguity.

Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327.

The extrinsic evidence offered by Mr.

Guevara

factual

gives

judgment.

rise

to

a

dispute,

precluding

summary

Winegar, 813 P. 2d at 107. The court below erred, either

by ignoring that evidence or by resolving the fact dispute.
(3)
The court below erred by granting summary judgment, on the
basis of one part of one provision in an incomplete and ambiguous
contract.

It did so in favor of the party drafting the contract.

In so doing, the court

ignored and failed to follow

cannons of contract interpretation.
1268-69

standard

Cox v. Cox, 877 P. 2d 1262,

(Utah App. 1994); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros.

Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); Sparrow, 846 P.2d 1323.
IX.
ARGUMENT
This appeal turns upon whether or not the facts of record
undisputedly establish that, as a matter of law, Morris Air has no
liability for the acts and omissions of Tur Mexico.

See Winegar v.

Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991)(summary judgment is
10

proper only where the material facts are undisputed and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law) . They do not, and that
judgment must be reversed.
On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing
court views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
the losing party. Id. " [I]t takes one sworn statement under oath to
dispute the arguments of the other side . . . and create an issue
of fact" precluding summary judgment.

Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542

P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) . Moreover, even if the parties generally
agree as to the underlying historical facts, any legitimate dispute
as to the "understanding, intention or consequences of those facts"
still precludes summary judgment.
12 91, 12 92

(Utah 1978).

Sandberg v. Klein, 575 P.2d

Here, the evidence submitted by Mr.

Guevara creates a dispute as to the ultimate fact issues of Morris
Air's relationship with Tur Mexico and the meaning of its agreement
with Mr. Guevara.

Summary judgment therefore, is precluded.

The Order granting summary judgment contains no statement of
the court's reasoning, which renders it subject to question. See
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 115 (Utah
1991) . Regardless of the basis of its decision, the trial court
erred in arriving at the conclusion that Morris Air was immune, as
a matter of law, from liability for the acts and omissions of Tur
Mexico.

To the extent that the court found that Morris Air was

merely a "travel agent," immune from liability, it resolved a
11

legitimate factual dispute as to Morris Air's status.

It also

erred, as a matter of law, in holding that such a status confers
absolute immunity.

To the extent that the court relied upon ^ 13

of the charter ticket, it erred either by holding that provision to
be unambiguous or by resolving the factual dispute raised by the
extrinsic evidence.

Indeed, it is apparent that the trial court

ignored basic rules of contract interpretation, in blindly giving
effect to one part of one provision, without considering the whole
contract and whether or not it was, not only unambiguous, but
complete and integrated.
(A)
THE COURT BELOW COULD NOT RESOLVE THE FACT
ISSUE OF AGENCY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under Utah law, the relationship between Morris Air and Tur
Mexico--be it principal and agent, joint ventures or partners-depends upon the facts and circumstances as a whole.

See Vina v.

Jefferson Insurance Co. of N.Y. , 761 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988)
("agency

relationship

is determined

from

all

the

facts

and

circumstances"); Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980)
("joint venture must depend upon the facts of each case");

Accord,

Strand v. Crannev, 607 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 1980) (joint venture is
question

of

fact).

A

formal

written

contract

of agency or

association is not required to establish such a relationship.
Score, 611 P. 2d at 369.

See

Moreover, the existence and terms of

written agreements, although relevant, are not- conclusive.
12

See

Score, 611 P. 2d at 369 ("agreement is less important than the acts
and conduct of the parties").

Indeed, even if there is a written

contract, "parol evidence is admissible" to prove agency.
v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992).

Garland

See also Horrocks

v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P. 2d 14 (Utah App. 1995) (equipment
seller was responsible for its agent's absconding with merchandise,
notwithstanding buyer's execution of written acknowledgement of
receipt before actual delivery).

The law does not permit one to

hold another out as its agent or partner, then later deny that
relationship to the detriment of innocent third parties.

See

Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980); Garland, 831
P.2d at 110; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218-19 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr.

Guevara

offered

documentary

and testimonial

evidence

showing that Morris Air held Tur Mexico out as its agent or
associate.

The trial court was obliged to consider that evidence,

regardless of the existence and content of any written agreements.
See Garland, 831 P.2d at 110. Even if those facts themselves were
not disputed by Morris Air, the issue of whether or not they give
rise to an agency relationship is one of fact for the jury.

See

Zions First National Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090,
1095-96 (Utah 1988) (summary judgment not proper as fact intensive
issue of agency).

Morris Air certainly could not obtain judgment

13

in its favor by simply asserting that it was only a travel agent,
and by failing to produce a written contract with Tur Mexico.3
Moreover, even if the court could accept Morris Air's selfserving and unsupported assertion that it was only a travel agent,
that status does not confer some sort of absolute legal immunity.
Morris Air did cite several cases below, in which travel agents
were held not liable for the acts or omissions of others providing
services as part of a tour.

Mr. Guevara cited to other cases, in

which a party claiming to be a travel agent was held actually or
potentially liable for another's acts.

See Casey v. Sanbourn, Inc.

of Texas, 478 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App. 1972) (travel agent vicariously
liable for driver's negligence); Hudson v. Continental Bus System,
Inc. , 317

S.W.2d

584

(Tex. App.

1958)

(jury

question

as

to

relationship between travel agent and connecting carrier); Rookard
v. Mexicoach, 680 F.2d

1257

(9th Cir. 1982)

(summary judgment

inappropriate as to travel agent's liability for bus accident);
Jacobsen v. Princess Hotels International, inc., 475 N.Y.S.2d 846
(1984) (travel agent could be liable for hotel's negligence).
The common denominator among both parties' cases is that they
are fact intensive.

Indeed, some of these cases specifically hold

that summary judgment is improper in "travel agent cases" on the
very

ground,

that

the

inquiry

is

3

too dependent

upon

overall

If anything, Morris Air's failure to deny Mr. Guevara's
evidence would support judgment in his favor.
14

circumstances.

See Hudson, 317 S.W.2d at 589; Jacobsen, 475

N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.

These cases look to the facts to ascertain

whether or not the travel agent's involvement exceeded merely
making reservations. See Jacobsen, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 15 848-49. Where
the so-called "travel agent" is actually the seller of a vacation
package, which it provides, it may be liable. Ld.

Here, Mr.

Guevara's evidence, at a minimum, raises an issue as to the fact
that Morris Air sold a package.
The upshot
immunizing

of all this,

a party which

is that there

is no clear rule

claims to be a travel agent.

Utah

certainly recognizes no such rule--none of the cases cited by
either party are from Utah.

However, the cases cited by Mr.

Guevara, which recognize the fact intensive nature of the issue,
are more consistent with Utah law governing agency and summary
judgment.

See e.g., Zions Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095-96.

Rogers

M. 0.

v.

Bitner

Co. , 738

P.2d

1029,

1032

See also

(Utah

1987)

(existence of joint venture "is ordinarily a question of fact");
Hoth, 799 P.2d at 218-19 (ostensible real estate agent held to be
partner due to more extensive involvement).
Here, Mr. Guevara has met his burden to proffer evidence from
which a reasonable fact finder could conclude, that Tur Mexico was
Morris

Air's

agent

or

associate.

Contrary

to

Morris

Air's

suggestions, this evidence is not mere conjecture and subjective
interpretation.

It

consists

of

15

specific

oral

and

written

representations by Morris Air, including that it was "represented
. . . by Tur Mexico."

It includes the very nature of the package,

which Mr. Guevara purchased.

To the extent that the court below

weighed this evidence and decided the agency issue, it clearly
erred and must be reversed.
(B)
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE
CHARTER TICKET/AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE MORRIS
AIR'S LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF TUR
MEXICO
Because the Order granting summary judgment does not specify
the basis of that decision, it becomes necessary to consider all of
the possibilities.

There are three, all of which involve some

reversible error.

First, the court may have decided that the

contract

unambiguously precluded

liability.

Because

the very

provision cited by Morris Air, 1 13, is internally contradictory,
the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law.
Tayco Construction Co., 846 P.2d

1323, 1327

See Sparrow v.
(Utah App. 1993) .

Second, the court may have either ignored the extrinsic evidence
offered by Mr. Guevara or weighed that evidence in interpreting the
contract. That, too, constitutes error because, once a contract is
determined to be ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible and
summary judgment is improper if such evidence gives rise to any
dispute.

See Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327; Colonial Leasing Co. v.

Larsen Brothers Construction Co. . 731 P.2d 483, 487-88 (Utah 1986) .
Third, the court may have simply applied one part of one provision,
16

without

considering

whether

the

contract

was

complete

unambiguous, and without applying basic rules of construction.

and
See

Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 488 (" [o]nly when contract terms are
complete, clear and unambiguous can they be interpreted by the
judge on a motion for summary judgment . . . [otherwise] the intent
of the parties . . . is to be determined by the jury").
(1)
Summary Judgment Is Precluded Because The
Contract Is Ambiguous As A Matter Of Law, And
Morris Air Submitted No Extrinsic Evidence
Supporting Its Interpretation
The focus here is upon H 13, to which the parties ascribe
differing interpretations.
was

required

ambiguous.
App.

to determine

As a threshold matter, the court below
whether

or not

that

provision

was

See Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah

1994) .

The provision in question expressly states, that

Morris Air will act as "principal" with respect to entities such as
Tur Mexico.

It then provides that Morris Air is not the agent of

such entities, and that they are not agents of Morris Air but
independent contractors.4

It also provides that customers are

responsible for deviations from the package--suggesting otherwise

4

The notion, that these providers were hired by Morris Air as
independent contractors, is inconsistent with its claim to be a
mere booking agent. Morris Air cannot simply cast that relationship
into whatever different form is most immediately convenient to its
own purposes.
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for included items.

Mr. Guevara was injured during a tour, which

was part of the package.
A contract is ambiguous, as a matter of a law, if it gives
rise to more than one reasonable interpretation.

See Sparrow, 84 6

P. 2d at 1327. A contract which contains internal inconsistencies is
almost per se ambiguous.

Jd.

The interpretation of an ambiguous

contract--resolving the ambiguity--is a question of fact, as to
which summary judgment is generally inappropriate.

See Records v.

Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994).
The contradictory references to "principal" and "agent" within
the context of U 13, itself, render the contract ambiguous as a
matter of law.

This is particularly true where Morris Air seeks to

rely upon a disclaimer of liability.

See Interwest Construction v.

Palmer, 923 P. 2d 1350, 1357 (Utah 1996) (exculpatory clause must be
clear and unequivocal). Where Morris Air has specifically referred
to itself as a "principal," Mr. Guevara's assertion that it is a
principal is certainly a "plausible" interpretation.
846 P. 2d at 1327.

See Sparrow,

The fact, that Morris Air has a different (and,

perhaps, plausible) interpretation, does not obviate the existence
of a contrary interpretation--it just reinforces the ambiguity.
Given that the only extrinsic evidence was offered by Mr. Guevara,
it seems likely that the court erroneously held the provision to be
unambiguous.

See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108.
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Morris Air's attempt to explain the reference to "principal"
cannot be utilized to support summary judgment in its favor.
the

first place, this was presented

as mere argument

In

without

supporting evidence or affidavit. Moreover, even if Morris Air had
offered some evidence to support its explanation, such evidence
would be irrelevant to whether or not there was an ambiguity.
Sparrow, 846 P.2d at 1327; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107-8.
admissible

only

as

extrinsic

evidence

to

help

See

It would be
resolve

the

ambiguity--a fact question, which the court could not decide on
summary judgment.
The

reality

"principal."

See Records, 887 P.2d at 871.
is

that

Morris

Air

chose

to

use

the

term

It cannot escape the consequences of that choice or

eliminate that term by an after-the-fact explanation.

Indeed,

given the paucity of evidence offered by Morris Air and the rule,
that unresolved ambiguities are construed against the drafter of
the contract, the weight of the evidence supports Mr. Guevara's
view.

See Jones, Waldo et al. v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1372 (Utah

1996); Edwards & Daniels v. Farmer's Properties, 865 P.2d 1382,
1386, n.5 (Utah App. 1993).

It is certainly sufficient to preclude

summary judgment against him, where he is entitled to the benefit
of any reasonable inference.

19

(2)
The Extrinsic Evidence Offered By Mr. Guevara
Was Admissible And Sufficient To Create A
Disputed Issue Of Fact As To The Meaning Of
Paragraph 13
Once a contract

is determined

to be ambiguous, extrinsic

evidence is admissible to resolve the ambiguity.
P. 2d at 1327; Winegar, 813 P. 2d at 107.

See Sparrow, 846

Because the contract here

is ambiguous, the court below erred, if it either refused to
consider Mr. Guevara's extrinsic evidence or weighed that evidence.
Id.

It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the impact

of such evidence upon the meaning of the agreement between Morris
Air and Mr. Guevara. See Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 488.
That evidence includes the statements by Morris Air employees
to Mr. Guevara and the other written materials received from Morris
Air in connection with the trip.

This evidence weighs in favor of

an agency or joint venture relationship, under which Morris Air is
vicariously liable, and against the interpretation accepted by the
court.

Morris Air offered no extrinsic

evidence, but

criticized Mr. Guevara's evidence as conclusory.
sufficient.

merely

That is not

Nor does the fact, that the parties are in relative

agreement as to the historical facts eliminate the genuine dispute
which exists as to the ultimate issue--what the parties intended
the contract to mean.

See Sandberg, 575 P.2d at 1292.

In short, where, as here, the party against whom summary
judgment was entered has offered extrinsic evidence in support of
20

his interpretation of an ambiguous contract, the dispute as to
meaning is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
(3)
The Court Below Simply Applied One
Part
Of
One
Provision
Without
Adhering To The Standard Canons of
Contract Interpretation
A contract must be construed as a whole, with all of its parts
harmonized and accorded on meaning.
is

embodied

in more

than one

Where the parties' agreement

document

or writing,

documents must be considered and harmonized.
P.2d 1262, 1268-69 (Utah App. 1994).

all

such

See Cox v. Cox, 877

Another relevant threshold

matter is whether or not the contract is complete and integrated.
See Bailey-Allen Co. , 876 P.2d at 424.

Integration is an issue of

fact, as to which "all relevant evidence is admissible."

Hall v.

Process Instruments and Control, 890 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Utah 1995).
Thus,

conflicting

evidence

as

to

integration

would,

itself,

preclude summary judgment. Moreover, if the contract (the charter
ticket) is not integrated, other written materials provided by
Morris Air are not merely extrinsic evidence of intent.

They are

part of the contract.
The charter ticket contains no integration clause.

In fact,

H 2 0 unambiguously provides that Morris Air reserves the right to
amend the agreement without notice.

Accordingly, under the terms

of the agreement which Morris Air drafted, its written statement,
that Tur Mexico was its representative in Mexico, constitutes an
21

amendment to the agreement.

Any doubts in this regard should be

resolved against the party which assumed such a broad, one-sided
advantage.
It would appear, that the court below simply ignored the rules
of contract construction and gave effect to one isolated provision.
It did not expressly rule upon integration, ambiguity or clarity.
It

did

not

rule upon

extrinsic evidence.
liable.

the

admissibility

or

relevancy

of

any

It just decided that Morris Air could not be

See Interwest Constr., 923 P.2d

at 1356

(exculpatory

clause must be clear).
Yet, courts frequently go beyond a single provision or even an
entire written contract in ascertaining the intent of the parties.
In Colonial Leasing, 731 P. 2d 483, the court held that the parties'
agreement constituted a sale, notwithstanding that the written
contract was a lease.

In Sparrow, 846 P.2d 1323, the court held

that a contract, which purported to relate to personal services,
was actually an agreement for the sale of equipment and that the
services were incidental. See also Freedman v. Northwest Airlines,
638 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (City Ct. 1996) (refusing to dismiss claim by
passenger on basis of exculpatory clause).

These cases do not

support--nor does Mr. Guevara seek--some broad and indiscriminant
authority to rewrite contracts.

These cases demonstrate that the

corollary proposition, of blind adherence to a single, questionable
contract provision, is equally inappropriate.
22

What Mr. Guevara

seeks is to have a jury resolve the patent and obvious dispute as
to the meaning of his agreement with Morris Air and Morris Air's
relationship with Tur Mexico.
X.
CONCLUSION
In granting summary judgment in favor of Morris Air, the court
below clearly resolved disputed questions as to fact intensive
issues.

Mr. Guevara presented substantial evidence as to these

issues.

This was clear error, and the summary judgment should be

reversed and the case remanded for a trial on the merits.
XI.
ADDENDUM
Appellant does not believe that any addendum is necessary
here.

The order appealed from is a bare grant of summary judgment,

which contains no specific findings or conclusions. The record, as
a whole, contains only about 125 pages.
r i/v\
Respectfully submitted this
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